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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed an increase in the number of conflicts that
involve news media and various judicial proceedings. With recurring fre-
quency, parties have sought to compel disclosure of a newsgatherer's anony-
mous sources and confidential information. In these situations, reporters have
resorted to the use of the first amendment and the invocation of appropriate
state privilege statutes known as "shield laws" or "newsmen's privilege sta-
tutes" to withhold information that might identify an informant.! This privi-
lege is valuable because when the newsgatherer protects a source of news, he
increases the media's ability to acquire valuable information not otherwise
obtainable.
2
A reporter's privilege premised on constitutional grounds, however, has
been severely curtailed;3 any attempt to protect confidential sources and in-
formation with the use of the first amendment is uncertain, at best. Conse-
quently, reporters find that state shield laws afford the greatest protection of
their informants, though state legislatures have drafted these statutes with
varying degrees of expertise,4 and courts have interpreted shield laws in many
diverse ways.5
This Comment examines the present ability of reporters to avoid com-
pelled disclosures of news sources and information. This examination in-
cludes a discussion of the ineffective first amendment protection possessed by
newsmen;6 a review of the judicial treatment of other states' newsmen privi-
lege statutes and the shortcomings of some of those statutes;7 and recom-
mendations for the revision of the Ohio Shield Law to assure its increased
strength and consistent application in the future.8
II. A NEWSGATHERER'S CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
Newsgatherers attempting to remove confidential sources and informa-
tion from judicial scrutiny invariably raise the issue of a privilege created by
the freedom of the press clause of the first amendment of the United States
Constitution. 9 Indeed, some courts have specifically stated that any such
1. See text accompanying notes 53-136 infra.
2. See text accompanying notes 60-61 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 9-52 infra.
4. See note 57 and accompanying text infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 63-68 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 9-52 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 53-136 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 153-59 infra.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press ......
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privilege does emanate from the first amendment.' ° This privilege, framed
within constitutional terms, was first asserted in the case of Garland v.
Torre." Since its initial assertion, the first amendment argument has met with
limited success.
Typically, the newsgatherer claims that an effective press requires the
protection of confidential sources and material to assure the free flow of
information intended by the first amendment. 2 For the most part, courts
recognize that the compelled disclosure of a journalist's sources and informa-
tion may tend to impair a reporter's newsgathering capability. 3 Other courts,
however, have preferred to characterize such impairment as "speculative"' 4
or "indirect."15
Through the years, courts have wrestled with the alleged existence of a
"newsman's privilege" arising from the first amendment. Without exception,
these same courts have held that the first amendment's guarantee of freedom
of the press is not absolute, particularly when considered in connection with a
defendant's fifth amendment 6 right to due process and sixth amendmene 
7
right to compulsory process.'8 The vast majority of cases have held that
neither the United States Constitution nor the constitutions of the various
states grant any sort of a newsgatherer's testimonial privilege. 9 Further,
those courts that have failed to rule out the possibility of a first amendment
testimonial privilege have nevertheless produced the same result by holding
that nothing within those constitutions would prohibit a judicial proceeding
from compelling a news reporter to disclose a confidential source.
20
Despite a finding that newsgatherers possess no first amendment privi-
lege to withhold the identity of news sources, courts have been reluctant to
10. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-80 (1972); Reporters Comm. v. ATT, 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979); Anderson v. Nixon, 444 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (D.D.C. 1978); United
States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208, 211, 214 (D.D.C. 1972). "What is involved here is the right of the press to
gather and publish, and that of the public to receive news from widespread, diverse and ofttimes confidential
sources." Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1396 (D.D.C. 1973).
11. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
12. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-80 (1972). But see CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85
Cal. App. 3d 241, 250-51, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421,426 (1978) (the newsgatherer listed three press functions that would
be impaired by compelled disclosure). See also Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 229 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1958); Wolf v. People, 69 Misc. 2d 256, 258, 329
N.Y.S.2d 291, 294 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 39 A.D.2d 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1972).
14. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 694 (1972).
15. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 72, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011
(1972).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime .... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... *
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... "
18. See, e.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1958); Wolf v. People, 69 Misc. 2d 256, 258, 329
N.Y.S.2d 291, 294 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 39 A.D.2d 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1972).
19. See In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), affd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); In re Dan, 80 Misc.
2d 399, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1975); State v. Buchanan, 250 Or. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S.
905 (1968); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
20. In re Grand Jury, January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 681 (D. Md. 1970); Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713,
294 A.2d 149 (1972).
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accede to a party's demand for the disclosure of a reporter's confidential
source.2' Consequently, courts engage in an informal balancing of a party's
interest in the compelled testimony against any impairment of the first amend-
ment that results from such compelled testimony. Garland v. Torre2 first
initiated this balancing process. The Garland court held that a plaintiff's good
faith request for information that was crucial to preparation for trial was
superior to the news reporter's allegation of first amendment impairment.
Use of this balancing process was tantamount to a grant of an informal,
conditional privilege. Nevertheless, the Garland court refused to "recognize
such a privilege in the absence of a statute creating one. ' 24
A. Branzburg v. Hayes
For many years, the Second Circuit's Garland v. Torre decision re-
mained the authority, and other courts employed its balancing technique with
a variety of results. In 1972 the case of Branzburg v. Hayes was heard by
the United States Supreme Court. Presumably, Branzburg would lay to rest
the issue of a news reporter's first amendment privilege.
26
In Branzburg each reporter had been subpoenaed by a grand jury and
ordered to divulge the identity of confidential sources. Each of their refusals
to comply with the requested disclosures was accompanied by an assertion of
a conditional first amendment privilege, which, unlike an absolute privilege,
would require a reporter to divulge confidential material only after a sufficient
demonstration of a compelling need for the information.27 The Supreme Court
refused to recognize such a constitutional privilege? 8
Of primary concern to the Court was the importance of the grand jury to
the criminal system. 9 Conceivably, the denial of information such as the
21. The court in Cervantes v. Time, 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), stated:
We are aware of the prior cases holding that the First Amendment does not grant to reporters a
testimonial privilege to withhold news sources. But to routinely grant motions seeking compulsory
disclosure of anonymous news sources without first inquiring into the substance of a libel allegation
would utterly emasculate the fundamental principles that underlay the line of cases articulating the
constitutional restrictions to be engrafted upon the enforcement of State libel laws.
Id. at 992-93.
22. 259 F.2d 545, 548-50 (2d Cir. 1958).
23. Id. at 549-551. In Garland v. Torre, the plaintiff's request for the compelled disclosure of the source
was particularly persuasive because the plaintiff had unsuccessfully sought the identity of the source through a
variety of other means, id. at 551, and the source's identity went "to the heart of the plaintiff's claim." Id. at
550.
24. Id.
25. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
26. Branzburg v. Hayes was actually the consolidation of three cases granted certiorari on the issue of
whether the first amendment permitted newsgatherers under a grand jury subpoena to refuse to disclose the
identity of a confidential source: Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 402 U.S. 942
(1970); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App.), cert. granted, 402 U.S. 942 (1970); In re Pappas,
358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297, cert. granted, 402 U.S. 942 (1970).
27. 408 U.S. 665, 702 (1972).
28. Id. at 702-06.
29. Id. at 686-88. -'[T]he longstanding principle that 'the public.., has a right to every man's evi-
dence" ... is particularly applicable to grand jury proceedings." Id. at 688 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339
U.S. 323, 331 (1950)); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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identity of a news source could hamper the grand jury process. Moreover, the
Constitution created only one express testimonial privilege: the privilege
against self-incrimination embodied within the fifth amendment.30
The Branzburg court also acknowledged the administrative problems
associated with the recognition of a privilege arising from the broad language
of the first amendment.31 Justice White, in his majority opinion, expressed
particular wariness of the difficulty in establishing entitlement to the privilege
and an appropriate procedure for its application
p2
Despite the majority's denial of a testimonial privilege, Justice White's
opinion seems to indicate that a reporter's protection of confidential sourceg
retains some first amendment protection: "[N]ews gathering is not without its
First Amendment protections .... Grand juries are subject to judicial control
and subpoenas to motions to quash. We do not expect courts will forget that
grand juries must operate within the limits of the First Amendment as well as
the Fifth.' '33 A consideration of post-Branzburg decisions demonstrates the
failure of Branzburg to resolve the status of a newsgatherer's constitutional
privilege.
B. Post-Branzburg Decisions
Because Branzburg was a five to four decision,34 commentators have
recognized the significance of Justice Powell's concurring opinion.35 Justice
Powell stressed that the holding should be narrowly applied to instances in
which reporters are subpoenaed before grand juries?6 Furthermore, his con-
currence advocated the continued use of an informal balancing of the interest
of freedom of the press, on the one hand, with the interest of acquiring
relevant evidence on the other?7
30. 408 U.S. 665, 689-90 (1972).
31. Id. at 703-06.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 707-08.
34. Justice White's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Rehnquist, and Powell. Justice Powell added a brief concurrence "to emphasize... the limited nature of the
Court's holding." Id. at 709.
35. See, e.g., Comment, The First Amendment Newsman's Privilege: From Branzburg to Farber, 10
SETON HALL L. REV. 333, 350 (1979).
36. 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972).
37. Justice Powell said:
As indicated in the concluding portion of the opinion, the Court states that no harassment of
newsmen will be tolerated. If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being
conducted in good faith he is not without remedy. Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to give
information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if he
has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source relationships without
a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to the court on a motion to quash and an
appropriate protective order may be entered. The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its
facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens
to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional
and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating
such questions.
In short, the courts will be available to newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First
Amendment interests require protection.
408 U.S. 665, 708-10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
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Post-Branzburg courts reflect varying interpretations of the case. Many
courts have held that Branzburg stood for the proposition that the first amend-
ment creates no newsperson's privilege to protect sources?8 But much as
Justice White had been in his majority opinion, 9 these same courts have been
unwilling to leave a newsgatherer without any semblance of first amendment
protection. The first amendment protection affords the newsperson the ability
to refrain from divulging confidential sources when such a request is not for a
legitimate purpose.40 Legitimacy may depend upon the necessity and rele-
vance of the identity of the news source. Thus, even jurisdictions that have
denied a first amendment testimonial privilege have seen fit to employ a
balancing process that turns on the perceived legitimacy of the demand for
compelled disclosure.
41
Courts have uniformly held that no absolute testimonial privilege arises
under the first amendment. 42 However, many jurisdictions have construed
Branzburg as having established a conditional or qualified privilege.43 Deci-
sions expressly recognizing the existence of a conditional privilege within the
first amendment have described their weighing process. Using Powell's con-
curring opinion" to support their process, those courts have promulgated a
case-by-case system that balances the competing rights of a party seeking
desired evidence and the rights of a reporter attempting to protect a news
source.
45
Neither the defendant's rights nor the newsgatherer's rights are "entitled
to per se precedence."-46 The judiciary's goal is to promote the freedom of the
press subject to the importance of a fair trial for a criminal defendant or a civil
party's need for evidence. The reconciliation of these competing interests is
to be accomplished by minimum interference with the rights of the parties.47
The elements used in determining the existence of a conditional first
amendment privilege have varied only slightly from decision to decision. The
two criteria common to the bulk of courts employing a balancing process are
38. United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972); In re Tierney, 328 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Ct. App.
1976); Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977); Dow
Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847 (1973); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330,
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
39. 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972).
40. See, e.g., In re Lewis. 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978).
41. See, e.g., In re Farber. 78 N.J. 259, 267--68, 394 A.2d 330, 334 (1978).
42. See, e.g., Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979).
43. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433
(10th Cir. 1977); Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. III. 1978);
Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp.
1394 (D.D.C. 1973); Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 912 (1976); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978).
44. "The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with
the traditional way of adjudicating such questions." 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
45. Altemose Constr. v. Building and Constr. Trades Council, 443 F. Supp. 489,491 (E.D. Pa. 1977); CBS,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 252, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421, 427 (1978).
46. CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 252, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421, 427 (1978).
47. Id.
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the relevancy of the testimony and the existence of a compelling state interest
in obtaining that testimony'
Different judicial proceedings call for subtle shifts of weight in the balanc-
ing process. When a request for a reporter's source occurs in the context of a
grand jury investigation, courts recognize a compelling need for the evi-
dence.49 Presumably, a state's interests are more compelling within the grand
jury system, which seeks to investigate allegations of crime and requires
greater freedom in its inquiry. States' interests in the acquisition of a reporter's
evidence are deemed more compelling in criminal actions than in civil ac-
tions,;5 conversely, the public's interest in the non-disclosure of a news-
gatherer's source in a civil case will more often outweigh the private interest
that seeks its disclosure.5
Post-Branzburg decisions are marked by their divergent reasoning;
Branzburg v. Hayes has failed to resolve the issue of a reporter's right to
protect the confidentiality of sources and material. The majority opinion in
Branzburg expressly accords state legislatures the authority to adopt a statu-
tory newsperson's privilege.52 It is through this type of legislation that news-
gatherers are gaining greater protection of their confidential material.
III. A NEWSGATHERER'S STATUTORY PRIVILEGE
Although apparently denied an express first amendment reporter's privi-
lege, journalists are not without legal protection for their confidential sources
and material. The Supreme Court indicated that a newsgatherer's privilege
may arise through state court interpretation of state constitutions, the enact-
ment of a federal shield law, or the enactment of state shield laws.53
Because of the great similarity between most state constitutions and their
federal counterpart, few state courts have availed themselves of Branzburg's
invitation to interpret their constitution as having created a newsperson's
48. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972);
Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Hammarley v.
Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979); Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190,
124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975). But see Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980); Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); Altemose Constr. v. Building and Constr. Trades Council, 443
F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973) (requiring
the party seeking disclosure to exhaust other means available).
49. Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1975); Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy Circulat-
ing Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197, 1201 (N.D. II. 1978). But cf., In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 268-69, 394 A.2d 330, 334
(1978) (need for evidence is at least as compelling in criminal trial as in grand jury proceeding).
50. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759
(1981); Reporters Comm. v. AT&T, 593 F.2d 1030, 1053 (D.D.C. 1978); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778,784
(2d Cir. 1972); Altemose Constr. v. Building and Constr. Trades Council, 443 F. Supp. 489,491 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass.
317, 319, 303 N.E.2d 847, 849 (1973).
51. See cases cited in note 50 supra.




privilege.54 Inarguably, common law provided no such privilege.5 5 As a result
of this void, state privilege statutes have become the most effective means of
permitting a news reporter to retain the confidentiality of his sources and
certain material. In fact, the Branzburg decision has spawned a surge in the
number of state shield laws. At the time of Branzburg v. Hayes, seventeen
states had news reporter privilege statutes in effect-s6 now, a total of twenty-
six states have similar laws in operation.57
A. The Construction of State Shield Laws
State legislative efforts appear to be a natural and appropriate vehicle for
formulation of the scope of statutes such as reporter shield laws. The notion
of a news reporter's privilege is a new issue; accordingly, it is more a part of
"social policy" than "fundamental principle.'8 s Additionally, legislative
bodies possess a greater ability to marshall empirical studies and "factfinding
resources" in a quest for an effective shield law. 9
Once a state legislature enacts a statutory testimonial privilege for news-
gatherers, it becomes the role of the courts to interpret and implement the
intent of the lawmakers. Any enactment of a testimonial privilege is by defini-
tion an exception to the general rule requiring disclosure of subpoenaed in-
formation, and the affirmative act of adopting a newsperson's privilege serves
to make a strong statement for a public policy of granting the greatest privi-
lege possible within the strictures of the federal and state constitutions.
The obvious statutory intent is to encourage the divulgence of news by informants
who might otherwise hesitate to disclose matters of public import for fear of
unfavorable publicity or the possibility of retribution resulting from their being
54. But see Opinion of the Justices, 373 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1977) (state constitution created a qualified
privilege).
55. E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685 (1972); United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208, 214
(D.D.C. 1972); Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439, 440 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Brewster v. Boston Herald-
Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416,417 (D.C. Mass. 1957); Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
56. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689 n.27 (1972) (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania).
57. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25 150 (1973); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-2237 (Supp. 1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1980); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-119 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1980); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1972); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45.1451-1454 (West Supp. 1980); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1980); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.945(l) (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 93.601-2 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20.144-. 147 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21, to -21.9 (west Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (Supp. 1981); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Page
1954); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (Page Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1979); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1
to -3 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980).
58. Edelstein and LoBue, Journalist's Privilege and the Criminal Defendant, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 913,
922 (1979).
59. Id. at 923.
60. E.g., In re Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465,470 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App.
3d 388, 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608, 614 (1979); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 270, 394 A.2d 330, 335 (1978).
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revealed as the source of a particular news item. In so providing, our statute
supports the basic right of the public to be informed by permitting a newspaper
reporter to maintain the confidentiality of his news sources. 61
Indeed, the enactment of a statutory privilege indicates that the legislature
believes the benefit provided outweighs its administrative difficulties in judi-
cial proceedings. 62
Nevertheless, a shield law does not always encounter broad and accom-
modating application by a court. The common law provided for no such
testimonial privilege.63 Privileges in derogation of the common law are strictly
construed.64 Some courts are unwilling to infer that the state legislature in-
tended an alteration of the common law principle greater than is expressly
indicated in the statute itself.65 Additionally, other courts employ a strict
construction of shield laws because the privilege is a type based on a
confidential relationship"
At the other end of the continuum are jurisdictions willing to give a
statutory newsperson's privilege wide applicability and effect by construing
its terms broadly.67 These courts believe that a liberal construction serves to
facilitate both the free flow of information and the protection of the public's
interest in newsgathering that were envisioned by the state's lawmaking
body.6"
Obviously, such divergent opinions relating to the breadth of construc-
tion greatly affect a shield law's scope and vitality. The employment of strict
construction by a court generally makes the eventual denial of the statutory
privilege a foregone conclusion. Consequently, the specificity of the statutory
language becomes very important in assuring the implementation of a legis-
lature's intent.
61. Dumez v. Houma Mun. Fire and Police Civil Serv. Bd., 341 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
62. See Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Print. and Pub. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 273, 197 A.2d 416,418 (1964).
63. See note 55 supra.
64. E.g., In re Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478,486,30
A.2d 421,426 (1943). But cf. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970), affd, 408 U.S. 665
(1972) ("The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed does not apply in
Kentucky.")
65. See cases cited in note 64 supra.
66. WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 A.D.2d 5, 7, 344 N.Y.S.2d 393, 394 (1973); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d
345, 347 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970), affd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
67. E.g., Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 217, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 445 (1975); In re Taylor,
412 Pa. 32, 42, 193 A.2d 181, 185-86 (1963). The court of In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978), stated:
We read the legislative intent in adopting this statute in its present form as seeking to protect the
confidential sources of the press as well as information so obtained by reporters and other news media
representatives to the greatest extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States and that of the
State of New Jersey.
Id. at 270, 394 A.2d at 335.
68. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 217, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427,445 (1975); In re Taylor, 412 Pa.
32, 42, 193 A.2d 181, 185-86 (1963).
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B. Scope of State Shield Laws
1. Nature of Material Protected
The most obvious distinction between various state statutes is the type of
information that the shield law seeks to protect. Some statutes are written to
preserve the confidentiality of a newsgatherer's source.69 These laws permit a
reporter to refuse to disclose the identity of a news informant when so re-
quested at a judicial proceeding. Other reporter shield statutes provide for
the confidentiality of certain information as well by allowing a journalist to
refuse to divulge certain material acquired in the course of newsgathering. 0
Generally, courts construing statutes that protect a newsgatherer's
source of information have limited this protection to the identity of the in-
formant.7' Interpreting a New Jersey statute that provided for the protection
of a reporter's source, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the means
by which the informaton was transmitted to the reporter was not within the
purview of the statute. 2 A California Court of Appeals, however, held that
such a privilege could also be inferred to apply to any information that would
tend to reveal the identity of the source.73 In what may only be described as
judicial legislation, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania extended the Pennsyl-
vania statutory privilege for journalists to documents, even though the
statute's language encompassed only the identity of sources. 4
Legislators granting the testimonial privilege to reporters for news infor-
mation, as well as identity of sources, are sensitive to the inextricable inter-
twining75 of news information and sources. Statutes granting a privilege to the
information itself do so for two reasons. First, information will sometimes
point to an obvious source, thus negating any protection of the informant.76
Second, some information is received by newsgatherers with the understand-
ing that it will never be divulged. Information of this type is used by a reporter
for the purpose of obtaining "leads" in the pursuit of additional facts 7 Un-
69. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 12 § 21-142 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1
(Bums Supp. 1980); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45.1451-.1454
(West Supp. 1980); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12
(Page 1954); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (Page Supp. 1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon
1980).
70. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to -21.9 (West
Supp. 1980); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976).
71. Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971), aff'dsub nor. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App.), cert. granted, 402 U.S. 942 (1970); Dumez v.
Houma Mun. Fire and Police Civil Serv. Bd., 341 So. 2d 1206 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App.
713, 294 A.2d 149 (1972).
72. State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 487, 30 A.2d 421, 426 (1943).
73. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 218, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 445 (1975).
74. In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
75. Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 417, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442, 447 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
76. In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 43, 193 A.2d 181, 186 (1963) (providing documents with names of sources
deleted insufficient to protect identity).
77. Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1979) (the statutory privilege
covered all information-not just that information that might tend to disclose the source. Id. at 397-98, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 612-13).
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less shield laws protect this material, much valuable information may be
withheld from reporters.
2. Disseminated and Undisseminated Material
A reporter's ability to claim protection of a statutory shield law may
depend on whether the information has been incorporated within a publica-
tion or broadcast. When dealing with statutes that include protection for a
reporter's information, the result may be ridiculous. For example, the New
Jersey shield law purports to protect the confidentiality of a newsperson's
sources, as well as "[a]ny news or information obtained in the course of
pursuing his professional activities whether or not it is disseminated.- 78 Its
language purports to permit a newsgatherer to refuse to divulge subpoenaed
information that has already been published or broadcast to the public at
large.79 This protection is nonsensical. Perhaps a more realistic interpretation
would be that dissemination of certain material would not require the dis-
closure of all information concerning the same subject!0
Certain state shield laws that protect confidential sources extend such a
privilege only when the information contributed by the informant has been
printed or broadcast. 8' For example, a Kentucky statute has been in-
terpreted to provide that the newsgatherer's privilege is not activated until the
source's information is disseminated 82 Statutes like these could produce in-
equitable or unforeseen results. Informants whose material is never used or
whose information is in preparation for printing or broadcast would be with-
out statutory protection. To insure more certain protection for his source, a
newsgatherer would be racing to publish or broadcast. Stories involving a
large amount of information culled from a number of confidential sources
require special consideration. If the statutory prerequisite is strictly applied,
the dissemination of one source's information would not entitle contributing
sources to statutory protection.
The requirement that the information be disseminated for the source to
gain protection places an unnecessary condition on the privilege. An in-
formant provides a reporter with facts for that newsgatherer's use. In return,
the informant asks for assurances that his identity will not be revealed. It is
unimportant to that source that the information was never used in an article or
78. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-21(b) (1980).
79. Actual dissemination of the requested information generally constitutes a waiver. See text accompany-
ing notes 112-20 infra.
80. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(c) (West Supp. 1980) (definition of -'unpublished information").
81. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 12 § 21-142 (1975) protects "the sources of any information procured or obtained
by [a reporter] and published in the newspaper, broadcast by any broadcasting station, or televised by any
television station."
82. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970), aff'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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broadcast. Fortunately, a majority of the statutes that protect a source's
identity have no requirement that the information be disseminated.
83
3. Court Order Violations
Shield laws will not obstruct a court's attempt at determining the violator
of a court order. In Rosato v. Superior Court84 a portion of a grand jury
transcript appeared in a newspaper prior to the trial, even though the trial
court had ordered its contents sealed to prevent dissemination. In Farr v.
Superior Court85 the trial court had prohibited any party to the case from
revealing testimony or evidence prior to the trial in an effort to avoid pre-trial
publicity. Nevertheless, a reporter received copies of a witness' pre-testi-
mony statement from one of the attorneys. In each instance, the journalists
were ordered to identify the party who had violated the court order. In re-
sponse to the court orders, the reporters asserted their statutory privilege.
The appellate court in each case held that a reporter may not invoke his
statutory privilege during an investigation growing out of a violation of a court
order ! 6 Two compelling needs require the disclosure of a source despite an
applicable statute. First, the court must be able to enforce its order prohibit-
ing publicity and to sanction those court officers who disobey.87 Second, the
enforcement of a court order protects the public's interest in fair trials.88
4. Definitional Considerations
Any consideration of the scope of state shield laws necessarily includes a
look at definitional problems.89 A few states have wisely included within their
law a definition section designed to assist a court in its determination of a
news reporter's entitlement to the testimonial privilege.9 Unfortunately,
statutes like these are rare; a majority of the shield laws offer no definitions
for their terms.
When an individual asserts the protection of these statutes, it may be
difficult to decide whether he is a "professional journalist" 9' or whether the
subject matter is "news 92 within the meaning of the statute. A definition
83. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Bums Supp. 1980) protects
the source of any information procured or obtained in the course of his employment or representa-
tion... whether published or not published in the newspaper or periodical, or by the press association
or wire service or broadcast or not broadcast by the radio station or television station by which he is
employed.
84. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
85. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
86. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 224, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 450 (1975); 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 72, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349
(1971).
87. Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 72, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (1971).
88. Id.
89. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-04 (1972).
90. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-21(a) (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW 79-h(a) (McKinney
1976).
91. People v. LeGrand, 67 A.D.2d 446, 451, 415 N.Y.S.2d 252, 255 (1979).
92. Wolfv. People, 69 Misc. 2d 256, 260,329 N.Y.S.2d 291,296 (Sup. Ct. 1972), aff'd, 39 A.D.2d 864, 333
N.Y.S.2d 299 (1972).
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section assists a court in divining a legislature's intent and increases the
probability that its intent will be given proper effect.
5. News Reporters as Eyewitnesses
Newspersons find themselves outside the scope of a shield law when they
observe an act firsthand, a result that has come about through judicial deci-
sion93 and certain statutory language. 94 When a news reporter is an observer
of an act or conduct, the newsman becomes the "source.- 95 In cases in which
the reporter is the only eyewitness, the public interest in law enforcement
outweighs the burden placed on newsgatherers, and thus testimony regarding
the acts they have observed is compelled.96
6. The Element of Confidentiality
State shield laws contemplate the protection of sources and information
involved in the confidential transmittal of news from the source to the journal-
ist. Quite logically, courts require an element of confidentiality to be present
before they are willing to extend the statutory privilege. 97 If the source did not
take measures to protect his identity or rely on a reporter's protection of his
anonymity, the informant was apparently unconcerned with the disclosure of
his identity, and no privilege should ensue. This appears to be a reasonable
requirement; the problems arise when proceedings attempt to discern the
presence or absence of the confidential relationship.
Wolf v. People" enumerated a two-part test that a newsgatherer must
satisfy in order to receive protection under the New York shield law. First,
the source must have given the information to a reporter with an understand-
ing, express or implied, that the informant or the source would not be dis-
closed?9 Second, the journalist must have received the information in the
course of newsgathering.'" Other New York courts have been quick to adopt
the Wolf test.'0 '
93. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 218, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 446 (1975); Branzburg v.
Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); People v. DuPree, 88 Misc. 2d 791, 796, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1000,
1003 (Sup. Ct. 1976); In re Dan, 80 Misc. 2d 399, 403, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493, 498 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
94. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-21a(h) (West Supp. 1980) (definition of-in the course of pursuing
his professional activities").
95. E.g., "When a newsman, by dint of his own investigative efforts, personally observes conduct
constituting the commission of criminal activities .... the newsman, and not the persons observed, is the
.source' of the news or information in the sense contemplated by the statute." Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App.
713, 725, 294 A.2d 149, 156-57 (1972).
96. In re Dan, 80 Misc. 2d 399, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (television reporter's observations in
Attica prison during a riot not privileged).
97. E.g., Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410,419,400 N.Y.S.2d 442,448 (Sup. Ct. 1977); In re Dan, 80
Misc. 2d 399, 401, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493, 496-97 (Sup. Ct. 1975); WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 A.D.2d 5, 6-7, 344
N.Y.S.2d 393,394 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Wolf v. People, 69 Misc. 2d 256,260, 329 N.Y.S.2d 291,296 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
98. 69 Misc. 2d 256, 329 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
99. Id. at 261, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
100. Id.
101. Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410,418,400 N.Y.S.2d 442,447 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Davis v. Davis, 88
Misc. 2d 1, 3-4,386 N.Y.S.2d 992, 994 (Fain. Ct. 1976); People v. Marahan, 81 Misc. 2d 637,647,368 N.Y.S.2d
685, 695 (Sup. Ct. 1975); In re Dan, 80 Misc. 2d 399, 401, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493, 496 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
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Andrews v. Andreolil°2 further explained the meaning of an express or
implied understanding of confidentiality. Under the Andrews requirements,
both the source and the newsperson must have a common intent to preserve the
anonymity of a source or information.)° A news reporter may establish such a
mutual intent by presenting preponderant evidence of an express agreement
or circumstances that reasonably imply an unspoken agreement of confiden-
tiality.0° An unspoken, implied-in-fact understanding of confidentiality arises
from the conduct of the reporter and the source, custom and usage, or other
surrounding circumstances tending to indicate that an informant desires
anonymity. 0 5 The second element of the Wolf test (reception of the informa-
tion while in the process of newsgathering) indicates a presumption that ma-
terial gained while not acting as a reporter lacks a confidential nature."°
C. Waiver of the Statutory Privilege
Even if a newsgatherer successfully demonstrates that he is within the
scope of a shield law, the party seeking disclosure may allege that the reporter
has waived his statutory privilege. Courts view the shield laws as conferring a
voluntary privilege on the journalist-not the source.'07 Consequently, the
informant may not assert the shield law; only the newsgatherer can decide
whether to utilize the privilege.08 The courts, however, may decide that the
asserted privilege has been waived. A waiver may occur, for example, when a
defendant reporter asserts an affirmative defense of good faith or truth in a
defamation action or when the source has been disclosed in some manner.
I. Affirmative Defenses in Defamation Cases
The exercise of a statutory privilege often occurs within the context of a
libel or defamation action. Typically, a defendant reporter will plead the
affirmative defense of truth, lack of malice, fair comment, or good faith.) 9
Upon the reporter's so pleading, a plaintiff will seek to discover the identity of
the reporter's source. Disclosure of ajournalist's source may assist the plain-
tiff's action in three respects."0 First, examination of the source could show
that the newsgatherer included information beyond that which was provided
102. 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
103. Id. at 418, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 447-48.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The question remains whether unsolicited information that was volunteered to a newsgatherer would
be construed as having been obtained while in the process of newsgathering. This question was answered in the
affirmative in Davis v. Davis, 88 Misc. 2d 1, 386 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Fam. Ct. 1976).
107. E.g., Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 724, 294 A.2d 149, 156 (1972); Brogan v. Passaic Daily
News, 22 N.J. 139, 151, 123 A.2d 473, 480 (1956).
108. Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 151, 123 A.2d 473, 480 (1956).
109. E.g., Mazzella v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Beecroft v. Point
Pleasant Print. and Pub. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (1964); Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J.
139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956).
110. See cases cited in note 109 supra.
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by the informant. Second, the identity of the source could distinguish the
informant as a questionable source. Third, the plaintiff could contend that the
journalist acted in bad faith by relying on an unreliable source without proper
corroborative facts.
Judges are sensitive to the inequity of allowing a reporter to assert these
affirmative defenses without providing the name of the source. Therefore,
courts have held that the assertion of the affirmative defenses of fair com-
ment, good faith, truth, and lack of malice in a libel case constitutes a waiver
of a news reporter's statutory privilege."'
2. Disclosure of Material
Although some statutes require the dissemination of information to occur
before the privilege is activated," 2 most jurisdictions are in general agreement
that disclosure of a source of information constitutes a waiver of the statutory
privilege. 3 In the words of a New York court: "The statute, therefore,
cannot be used as a shield to protect that which has already been exposed to
view."114
As noted above, the privilege may be wielded only by the reporter;" 5 how-
ever, its waiver may be effected through disclosure of the identity of the
source or information by either the informant or the journalist." 6 To ascertain
whether there has been a waiver through disclosure, the extent of the dis-
closure is relevant. In Saxton v. Arkansas Gazette Co." 7 a reporter's volun-
tary, informal disclosure of the identity of a source to his editor and a deputy
prosecuting attorney did not constitute a waiver."8 However, a waiver of
confidentiality does occur when the source testifies or consents to his identifi-
cation as the source." 9
An interesting issue arises in jurisdictions whose statutes provide for the
confidentiality of information as well as of the identity of sources. Does a
waiver through disclosure of information act as a waiver of the privilege
concerning the identity of the source and vice versa? One court that has
addressed this question indicated that the waivers of confidential information
and sources through disclosure operate independently of one another.20 In
other words, the publishing of information obtained from a confidential
111. Id.
112. See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra.
113. E.g., People v. Zagarino, 97 Misc. 2d 181, 411 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup.Ct. 1978); Andrews v. Andreoli, 92
Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1977); In re Dan, 80 Misc. 2d 399, 363 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1975);
Wolf v. People, 69 Misc. 2d 256, 329 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1972); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
114. People v. Wolf, 39 A.D.2d 864, 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d 299, 301 (1972).
115. See text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
116. See, e.g., Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410,400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (source, who had
originally requested anonymity, identified himself to a special prosecutor as the individual who had spoken to
the news reporter).
117. 264 Ark. 133, 569 S.W.2d 115 (1978).
118. Id. at 136-37, 569 S.W.2d at 117.
119. People v. Zagarino, 97 Misc. 2d 181, 411 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
120. Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 419, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442, 448 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
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source would not be held a waiver of a statutory ability to protect the
anonymity of the informant.
The reasoning that underlies the concept of waiver through specific dis-
closure is consistent with the policy of a news reporter's privilege. It is un-
likely that a journalist can demonstrate the injurious impact on his news-
gathering processes caused by the compelled disclosure of sources or in-
formation whose disclosure has already occurred.
D. Implementation of the Statutory Privilege
At times, state shield laws may be difficult to implement. The existence
of the statute evidences a state policy of granting journalists the greatest
privilege possible within the requirements of the federal and state constitu-
tions.'2' A statutory privilege is not an absolute exemption from the responsi-
bility of providing relevant testimony.'2 It then becomes the role of the courts
to translate the conditional privilege into a workable system.
Some jurisdictions treat the presence of a shield law as nothing more than
an additional factor to consider in the weighing process.23 Other courts effect
greater protection for journalists by shifting the burden or instituting pro-
cedural safeguards. Legislative creation of a privilege shifts the burden to the
party seeking to defeat the privilege.'24 The party seeking disclosure must
demonstrate that the evidence requested is relevant, necessary, and not ob-
tainable elsewhere.' -
The New Jersey shield law 26 is an example of a statute expressly detail-
ing procedural guidelines to ensure effective protection. New Jersey courts
use two hearings to determine the extent of a journalist's privilege. Originally
formulated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1978,127 this two-step
process has since been codified.
28
Upon the request by a criminal defendant that the newsgatherer disclose
the identity of a source or information within his possession, a reporter is
entitled to assert his statutory privilege. His assertion triggers a threshold
hearing before the court, at which the news reporter is obliged to make a
prima facie showing that he qualifies as a newsgatherer within the meaning of
the statute and that the material was obtained while so engaged. 29 The de-
fendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a
reasonable probability that the requested material is relevant and necessary to
121. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
122. E.g., Dumez v. Houma Mun. Fire and Police Civil Serv. Bd., 341 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (La. Ct. App.
1976); People v. Monroe, 82 Misc. 2d 850, 856-57, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1013-14 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
123. See cases cited in note 122 supra.
124. E.g., Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 388, 399, 153 Cal. Rptr. 608, 614 (1979).
125. Id. It should be noted that these are the same criteria the newsmen in Branzburg v. Hayes asserted
were required by a first amendment privilege. 408 U.S. 665, 679-80 (1972).
126. N.J. SrAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to -21.9 (West Supp. 1980).
127. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 275-77, 394 A.2d 330, 338-39 (1978).
128. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to -21.9 (West Supp. 1980).
129. Id. § 2A:84A-21.3(a).
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a determination of guilt or innocence and that the subpoena is not overbroad
or oppressive.'3 Furthermore, the defendant seeking enforcement of the
subpoena must show that the desired information is not obtainable from a less
intrusive source.131 Alternatively, the defendant may show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the privilege has been waived.
If the court finds that the defendant has met his burden of proof by
demonstrating his need for the evidence, or by showing that the newsgatherer
has waived his privilege, an in camera inspection and second hearing ensue.' 33
Here, the requested material will be viewed. The in camera inspection in-
volves the same criteria as the preliminary hearing (relevancy, materiality,
necessity); however, the defendant must establish a more specific need for the
material viewed. At the conclusion of the in camera inspection and arguments
by both parties, the court will make its ruling and direct the disclosure of that
information it finds to be admissible and sufficiently relevant, material, and
necessary. 3' The decision of the trial court is subject to interlocutory appeal
by either party.35
As the Supreme Court of New Jersey has observed, the hearings and in
camera inspection act as "a preliminary step to determining whether, and if
so to what extent, the statutory privilege must yield to the defendant's con-
stitutional rights."' 36 Procedures such as this one are a just balancing of a
journalist's privilege and a party's right to evidence.
IV. THE OHIO SHIELD LAW
A. Current Status
Presently, two statutes comprise the Ohio Shield Law: Revised Code
section 2739.12,37 which relates to newspapers and press associations, and
Revised Code section 2739.04, 31 which involves radio and television broad-
130. Id. § 2A:84A-21.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. § 2A:84A-21.4.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 2A:84A-21.6.
136. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 275, 394 A.2d 330, 338 (1978).
137. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Page 1954):
No person engaged in the work of, or connected with, or employed by any newspaper or any press
association for the purpose of gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, disseminating, or publishing
news shall be required to disclose the source of any information procured or obtained by such person in
the course of his employment, in any legal proceeding, trial, or investigation before any court, grand
jury, petit jury, or any officer thereof, before the presiding officer of any tribunal, or his agent, or
before any commission, department, division, or bureau of this state, or before any county or munici-
pal body, officer or committee thereof.
138. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (Page Supp. 1980):
No person engaged in the work of, or connected with, or employed by any noncommercial
educational or commercial radio broadcasting station, or any noncommercial educational or com-
mercial television broadcasting station, or network of such stations, for the purpose of gathering,
procuring, compiling, editing, disseminating, publishing, or broadcasting news shall be required to
disclose the source of any information procured or obtained by such person in the course of his
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casting. Substantively, the protections they provide are identical, save for the
section 2739.04 requirement that television and radio broadcasters maintain a
record of information obtained from a source for six months after its broad-
cast. The Ohio Shield Law purports to protect only the source of news-not
the information obtained. Like so many other state shield laws, the Ohio
statutes are little more than general conferrals of a statutory privilege with no
express language describing procedural applicability or scope of entitlement.
There are few cases to assist in the interpretation of the Ohio statutory
privilege for newsmen; only four reported decisions involve its considera-
tion .139 The three earliest cases strictly construed the extent and application of
the Ohio Shield Law.
Deltec, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet'4" demonstrated the limited number of
journalistic entities that are entitled to section 2739.12 protection. The de-
fendant, who published for subscribers a bi-monthly report relating to busi-
ness concerns, was found not to have been within the confines of section
2739.12.41 The United States Disrict Court for the Northern District of Ohio
held that the shield law's protection was limited to newspapers and press
associations, which did not include periodicals or magazines. t42
Stokes v. Lorain Journal Co.143 involved a libel action. In compelling
disclosure of a confidential informant by the newsgatherers, the court did not
require the party seeking disclosure to prove either (1) that the newspaper
possessed the evidence or (2) that the evidence would be admissible in court.
It merely required the plaintiff to make a good faith showing that he believed
the compelled disclosure would lead to admissible evidence.' 44 This require-
employment, in any legal proceeding, trial, or investigation before any court, grand jury, petit jury, or
any officer thereof, before the presiding officer of any tribunal, or his agent, or before any commission,
department, division, or bureau of this state, or before any county or municipal body, officer, or
committee thereof.
Every noncommercial educational or commercial radio broadcasting station, and every noncom-
mercial educational or commercial television broadcasting station shall maintain for a period of six
months from the date of its broadcast thereof, a record of those statements of information the source of
which was procured or obtained by persons employed by the station in gathering, producing, compil-
ing, editing, disseminating, publishing, or broadcasting news.
As used in this section:
(A) "Record" includes a tape, disc, script, or any other item or document that sets forth the
content of the statements that are required by this section to be recorded.
(B) "Noncommercial educational television or radio broadcasting station" means a television or
radio broadcast station that is licensed by the federal communications commission as a noncommercial
educational radio or television broadcast station, transmits only noncommercial programs for educa-
tional purposes, and is owned and operated by:
(1) A public agency or institution or nonprofit private foundation, corporation, or association;
(2) A municipal corporation.
139. Deltec, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ohio 1960); In re McAuley, 63 Ohio
App. 2d 5, 408 N.E.2d 697 (1979); Forest Hills Utility Co. v. City of Heath, 66 Ohio Op. 2d 66, 302 N.E.2d 593
(C.P. 1973); Stokes v. Lorain Journal Co., 55 Ohio Op. 2d 363, 266 N.E.2d 857 (C.P. 1970).
140. 187 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
141. Id. at 790.
142. The court held that a magazine or periodical was a newspaper within the meaning of§ 2739.11 O.R.C.;
however, the § 2739.11 O.R.C. definition is specifically limited to §§ 2739.13-. 18. Id. at 789.
143. 55 Ohio Op. 2d 363, 266 N.E.2d 857 (C.P. 1970).
144. Id. at 369, 266 N.E.2d at 869.
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ment was a relatively light burden of proof to justify compelled disclosure
despite the existence of a statutory privilege-particularly in a civil action.
Recognizing that the purpose of section 2739.12 was to encourage the
flow of news, 45 the court in Forest Hills Co. v. City of Health' 6 permitted a
non-party reporter to refuse to answer deposition questions pertaining to her
source. Although extending the privilege granted under the shield law to the
reporter, the Forest Hills Co. decision carefully circumscribed the scope of
section 2739.12. The Common Pleas Court for Licking County limited "the
word 'source' to animate as opposed to inanimate objects.' 1 47 This construc-
tion precludes anything other than the identity of an informant from qualifying
for the protection of the statutory privilege.
Because of its unique nature, the ramifications of In re McAuley,"4 the
most recent Ohio Shield Law case, are still unclear. A defendant in a Cali-
fornia criminal trial sought to compel the appearance of an Ohio reporter in
his criminal proceedings by having the journalist deemed a material and
necessary witness. His intention was to compel the reporter to disclose con-
fidential information and identities of sources obtained during the preparation
of an article. Although it affirmed the trial court's finding that there was not
sufficient evidence to establish that the reporter was a material and necessary
witness, the appellate court proceeded to describe the nature of the Ohio
Shield Law.
In its decision, the McAuley court characterized the statutory privilege as
a conditional right not to reveal the name of a confidential source in either
grand juries or criminal trials. 49 The news reporter's conditional privilege
must be balanced against the sixth amendment rights of a defendant on a
case-by-case basis. 50
After this statement, the McAuley opinion began to speak about the
criminal defendant's lack of an absolute right to either a reporter's confiden-
tial information or sources. The court delineated the procedural mechanisms a
defendant in a criminal proceeding must satisfy before he may compel the
disclosure of a newsperson's confidential information or sources. 5 '
First, the defendant must show that the reporter or the source has rele-
vant evidence concerning the defendant's guilt or innocence. Second, the
defendant must demonstrate that he has exhausted alternative sources.
Finally, the defendant must review the journalist's non-confidential material
145. "The purpose of the statute is to encourage the flow of news from persons who might otherwise fear
the unfavorable publicity or retribution resulting from the revelation of their name as the source of the news
story." Forest Hills Util. Co. v. City of Heath, 66 Ohio Op. 2d 66, 69, 302 N.E.2d 593, 596 (C.P. 1973).
146. 66 Ohio Op. 2d 66, 302 N.E.2d 593 (C.P. 1973).
147. Id. at 69, 302 N.E.2d at 596.
148. 63 Ohio App. 2d 5, 408 N.E.2d 697 (1979).
149. Id. at 22, 408 N.E.2d at 709.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 5-6. 408 N.E.2d at 700.
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and request an in camera inspection by the court of the reporter's confidential
material. The defendant is then entitled to the reporter's confidential material
or the name of the confidential source if there is a reasonable probability that
the sought-after material or identity "will provide relevant evidence of the
defendant's guilt or innocence.' ' 52
The unsettling aspect of this approach is that the McAuley court failed to
attribute the necessity of this process to either the Ohio Shield Law or the
constitutions of the United States or Ohio. Nevertheless, the McAuley deci-
sion is extremely significant because it is the first time an Ohio court has
extended any sort of privilege to a newsgatherer's confidential information as
well as to the identity of confidential sources or has enunciated a procedural
mechanism for resolution of conflicts between a newsman's conditional privi-
lege and a criminal defendant's constitutional rights.
The McAuley decision may signal a trend of increasing protection of
reporters' confidential material in Ohio courts. Because of the decision's
failure to identify its source of lawful mandate, however, a newsgatherer's
ability to conceal the confidential identity of sources and confidential informa-
tion from judicial proceedings remains uncertain.
B. Recommendations
A reporter who wishes to protect the confidentiality of material within his
possession currently finds himself in limbo. After Branzburg v. Hayes and
subsequent decisions, he possesses some limited constitutional protection of
uncertain dimension and application. The improbability of the enactment of a
federal shield law'53 leaves state statutory privilege the most likely candidate
for the strengthening of a news reporter's already battered shield.
Owing to the lack of litigation and controversy, there have been few
instances that demonstrate the weaknesses and blindspots of the present Ohio
Shield Law. Nevertheless, a look at other state statutes and their history
should indicate the possible pitfalls awaiting inadequate and ambiguously
written shield laws such as sections 2739.04 and 2739.12. The weaknesses of
the Ohio newsman's privilege have not gone unnoticed. On January 18, 1978,
Representative Dean Conley introduced House Bill No. 123 in the Ohio
House of Representatives, with the intent of expanding the scope and pro-
tection of the current statutes.154
152. Id.
153. Over the years, Congress has introduced numerous bills in an attempt to formulate a federal shield
law. See, e.g., Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 829, 842
n.46 (1974). See also Dixon, Newsmen's Privilege by Federal Legislation: Within Congressional Power?, I
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 39 (1974). In October 1980 the 96th Congress passed a law restricting searches and
seizures of newsrooms, but there was no provision involving a reporter's testimonial privilege. See The Privacy
Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980). Currently, there is no existing federal shield
law.
154. H.B. 123, 113th Gen. Assembly (As Introduced), remained in the Ohio House of Representatives'
Judiciary Committee from February 7, 1979, until the close of the session in December 1980. The closing of the
session resulted in its death.
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Sections 2739.12 and 2739.04 stand as barometers of Ohio's policy con-
cerning the ability of news reporters to conceal the name of a confidential
source. In strong terms, the shield law symbolizes the commitment the legis-
lature has made to encouraging the free flow of information by facilitating the
use of confidential informants. However, its lack of substantive protection
serves to make it little more than a statement of general principles.
The scope of the statutory privilege must be broadened to reflect a more
realistic view of the components of modern journalism. A shield law seeking
to protect journalists' sources should not be limited to employees of radio and
television broadcasters or newspaper and press associations. A contemporary
newsman's privilege must include magazine and other similar periodicals of
general circulation. By no means do newspapers and broadcasters hold a
monopoly on the role of investigative reporting. Magazines and periodicals
deserve a like ability to protect their source. Deltec, Inc. v. Dun & Brad-
street155 demonstrates the courts' strict construction of the section 2739.12
privilege and their unwillingness to include the journalistic endeavors of
magazines and periodicals within the parameters of the statute.
As many of the cases show, reporters will strive to gain entitlement to a
state's shield law. The use of ambiguous terms with a variety of meanings
exacerbates the difficulty of determining whether a reporter and his material
are within the confines of statutory privilege. Ideally, a new Ohio Shield Law
would include a definitions section. A determination of entitlement or eligibil-
ity is the first instance in which a reporter's attempt at concealing confidential
information may be defeated by the courts. A definitions section would seek
to detail to the court which newsgatherers and material the Ohio General
Assembly sought to protect.
The scope of the Ohio newsman's privilege should be broadened to pro-
vide for the protection of confidential information as well as confidential
sources. In many cases, the protection of confidential information is equally
important. A source and his information may be so intertwined as to be
inseparable. 56 The compelled disclosure of confidential information is no less
an impairment to the journalist's newsgathering ability than the compelled
disclosure of the information's source. Additionally, the procedure detailed
below will provide for the defendant's acquisition of all necessary evidence.
After an expansion of the shield law's scope and the addition of defini-
tions, the Ohio courts will be left with the limited first amendment right
granted by Branzburg and the protection provided by the statutory privilege
to be balanced against a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right or the
needs of a party to a civil action.57 This balancing occurs at the trial court
155. 187 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
156. See text accompanying notes 69-77 supra.
157. The statutory privilege is applicable to both criminal prosecutions and civil actions. As discussed
earlier, the varying factor occurs in the weight given a criminal defendant's rights as opposed to a civil litigant's
needs. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra. Similarly, Branzburg does not preclude a reporter's assertion
of a statutorily created privilege in the context of a grand jury investigation. It does, however, indicate that great
weight will be given to the grand jury's needs. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
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level, and a glance at the cases discussed in this Comment shows the diverse
ways in which this balancing has been conducted.
An effective shield law requires procedural safeguards to ensure con-
sistent and somewhat predictable balancing and determination of news-
gatherer's privilege in various courts. A procedural mechanism resembling
New Jersey's two-step process'58 should be preferred. The first hearing
should involve a determination of the reporter's qualification as a news-
gatherer under the shield law and the probable relevance of the material and
identities sought. Finally, an in camera viewing by the court in the presence
of the parties would serve to limit the breadth of the disclosed material to the
minimum while preserving the rights of the party seeking disclosure.
In re McAuley raised the possibility of a similar process in Ohio. To
effectively protect a journalist's privilege, such a proposed procedure must be
uniformly followed. As aptly stated by Justice Frankfurter: "The history of
liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safe-
guards. -59 Thus, specific procedural guidelines must be incorporated within
the language of an amended Ohio Shield Law.
V. CONCLUSION
Investigative reporting is vital to an informed society that makes a com-
mitment to a free press. The use of secret sources is an inevitable product of
controversial reporting, and anonymous informants provide the public with
news that would otherwise remain unreported.
Journalists seeking constitutional protection of confidential sources find
a first amendment shield of undefined dimension and limited effectiveness.
The alternative available to some is state statutory shield laws.
As this Comment has disclosed, the efficacy of state shield laws varies.
Inconsistent interpretations result in unpredictable outcomes, and the ap-
plication of strict construction to the statutes succeeds in rendering negligible
much of the laws' usefulness. A source who demands anonymity requests
assurance from the reporter that his identity will remain confidential. The
present confusion surrounding the newsmen's privilege robs the reporter of
the ability to offer good faith assurances in order to continue obtaining
clandestine information.
By enacting a state shield law, the Ohio legislature has evidenced a state
policy that recognizes the value of confidential informants to newsgathering
and demonstrates a willingness to confer upon reporters a conditional right of
protection for their sources. Currently, the Ohio Shield Law suffers from the
weaknesses associated with ambiguous language that lacks substantive direc-
tion; narrow construction and unforeseen application limit its utility for the
158. See text accompanying notes 127-36 supra.
159. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
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practicing journalist. The statutory privilege should be revised to include a
detailed definitions section. Additionally, the amended shield law should
establish a procedural mechanism that would serve to protect the rights and
needs of litigants and provide reporters with a workable privilege possessing
identified parameters.
Charles S. Plumb
